

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE

25X1

25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Wednesday 14 June 1978

CG NIDC 78/138C

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

25X1

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 14 June 1978

25X1

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

LEBANON: Christian Vendetta	Page 1
NAMIBIA: Results of Meeting	Page 3
USSR-CHINA: Aleksandrov Attack	Page 4
ZAIRE: Situation Report	Page 5

25X1

USSR: Chemical Warfare Inspection	Page 8
NORWAY-USSR-EC: Fishing Concerns	Page 8
BRIEF:	Page 10
Malaysia	

LEBANON: Christian Vendetta

25X1 [] Yesterday's attack by Phalangist fighters on the household of ex-President Franjiyah's son Tony--who was killed along with his wife, his daughter, and a large number of bodyguards and supporters--will seriously destabilize northern Lebanon. The tension will probably permeate Christian ranks throughout the country, and fighting may break out in Beirut as well.

25X1 [] The attack follows a series of clashes over the past month between rival Christian factions in the north, many of them involving Phalangists against supporters of Franjiyah. The origins of the fighting are obscure; according to one account, it grew out of efforts by the Phalangists and possibly the National Liberal Party, the second major Christian grouping, to establish protection rackets.

25X1 [] The first incidents seem to have touched off a spiral of murder and retribution, as followers sought to pay off blood debts and generally promote their own group's political power. More than a dozen people had been killed up to yesterday's bloodbath.

25X1 [] Tony Franjiyah himself took part in an effort to calm the situation. Just last week, he met with other leaders of the "Lebanese Front"--the Christian umbrella organization--to denounce the latest clashes and pledge to prevent new outbreaks. Tony was a member of parliament from the Zgharta district in the north, his family's power base; he was one of the key northern leaders and was widely regarded as a politician with a promising future.

25X1 [] The assassination is likely to galvanize Tony's father Sulayman to strike out in revenge. Sulayman Franjiyah was President of Lebanon at the start of the civil war and is one of the country's traditional semifeudal leaders, in command of an army of several hundred. Franjiyah is quoted as having vowed a "war unto death." The obvious target would be Lebanon's largest Christian party, the Phalange, in particular its leader Pierre Jumayyil and his sons.

25X1

[] It is possible that the attack on Tony Franjiyah was not merely the result of local jockeying for power but a calculated attack by the main leadership of the Phalange on Sulayman Franjiyah. Franjiyah had been at odds with his erstwhile Christian colleagues over his general willingness to support Syrian policies in Lebanon. He had further antagonized the others--in addition to dramatizing the cracks in the Christian front--by his highly publicized "reconciliation" a month ago with a leading Muslim moderate, former Prime Minister Rashid Karame. Both Franjiyah and Karame have good relations with the Syrians.

25X1

[] Nevertheless, a calculated murder of Franjiyah's son by the Phalange leadership for these broader Lebanese political reasons seems unlikely; for all their willingness to fight, Lebanon's rival groups have usually avoided direct attacks on the leaders themselves or their immediate families, for fear of stirring up the kind of uncontrollable vendetta that Lebanon's feudal atmosphere encourages.

25X1

[] Regardless of the ultimate responsibility for the incident, however, it reflects a general struggle for dominance among Lebanon's rival Christian groups that will destabilize the country even further and will probably touch off additional fighting elsewhere.

25X1

25X1

NAMIBIA: Results of Meeting

25X1

[] Tanzanian President Nyerere says the meeting on Namibia of frontline Presidents last weekend in Luanda moved the South-West Africa People's Organization closer to acceptance of the five-power settlement proposals. The contentious issue of the South African residual defense force in Namibia, however, remains unresolved and is the principal barrier to a negotiated settlement.

25X1

[] Nyerere, acting as spokesman for the frontline Presidents, briefed ambassadors of the five-power contact group in Dar es Salaam and painted a generally optimistic picture of the session with SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma. He asserts that SWAPO will accept a statement by the contact group that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia and that this issue should be resolved in negotiations between an independent Namibian government and South Africa.

25X1

[] In addition, Nyerere said that SWAPO does not now insist that South African troops be confined to a single site deep in southern Namibia and would agree to their being stationed in "one or two locations south of Windhoek." Nyerere urged the contact group to press South Africa on this point, alleging that--if South Africa accepted--agreement would be close at hand.

25X1

[] Botswanan officials have informed the British that Nujoma raised a third concern at the summit--the effectiveness of the UN role during the transition period. The Tanzanians and Zambians had indicated that this question was not at issue during the talks.

25X1

[] South African Foreign Minister Botha responded to SWAPO's new position in predictably negative terms. He alleged that the proposal amounts to renegotiating a point Pretoria considered settled when it accepted the five-power package in late April. []

25X1

USSR-CHINA: Aleksandrov Attack

25X1

[] A blistering Soviet attack on China's foreign policy in yesterday's Pravda reflects the USSR's growing pessimism over the state of Sino-Soviet relations. The article was probably designed to warn the West and Japan of the "danger" Peking poses to international stability and to discourage improved ties with China.

25X1

[] The article--signed by "I. Aleksandrov," a pseudonym that indicates it was approved by the highest levels of the Soviet leadership--emphasized that Chinese foreign policy is a "destabilizing factor" in international relations that threatens to undermine detente and arms control. The article does not contain any new accusations against the Chinese, but Aleksandrov's comprehensive bill of particulars underscores the USSR's concern with what it sees as the growing scope and intensity of the Chinese challenge.

25X1

[] Aleksandrov fails to add the customary assurance that the USSR still desires to normalize state relations, clearly reflecting Moscow's frustration at its inability to improve state-to-state relations with the Chinese or to move the deadlocked border talks in Peking off dead center. The senior Sino-ologist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry recently told a visiting US academician that the border negotiations are "useless" and unlikely to make any progress as long as the Chinese continue to make unreasonable demands for Soviet territory.

25X1

[] The article's message is directed in large measure at the US, Japan, and key West European states, which the Soviets fear may be trying to improve their ties with China. Recent Soviet commentary has strongly suggested that Moscow is increasingly concerned that these states hope to gain political advantage for themselves by playing a "Chinese card" that will "oppose China to the Soviet Union."

25X1

[] Aleksandrov stressed that Westerners interested in cooperating with China against the Soviet Union are "truly playing dangerously with fire." His warning against the creation of a "new order," for example, was implicitly aimed at

the revival of Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations that could work to Soviet disadvantage in Asia. The Soviets have also been unusually direct in interpreting Dr. Brzezinski's visit to Peking last month as designed to bring pressure to bear on the USSR. [REDACTED]

ZAIRE: Situation Report

[REDACTED] //Troops from Togo and Ivory Coast, part of an eventual 2,000-man inter-African peacekeeping force, have arrived in Lubumbashi to help Zaire defend its southern frontier. The 1,500 Moroccan soldiers already in the city have not yet gone to Kolwezi; they have been waiting for other African troops to arrive and are still working out their tactical and command relationship with Zairian General Singha, military governor of Shaba Region. The Zambian Government has begun to cooperate with the Mobutu regime, arresting some of the rebels crossing through its territory and returning vehicles to Zaire that the rebels abandoned.//

[REDACTED] //The rebels are reported still to control access routes to the town of Luashi, near the Angolan border south of Mutshatsha. General Singha has been ordered to carry out clearing operations. In Lubumbashi, several hundred people have been arrested during house-to-house searches, and the Zairian Army has killed at least five individuals. The government has issued stricter regulations limiting the movement of individuals in and out of urban areas in order to prevent rebel infiltration.//

[REDACTED] The five Western allies will not present their demarche outlining political and economic reforms to President Mobutu until after the 10-country meeting on economic assistance to Zaire, which began in Brussels yesterday. The European allies do not want to humiliate Mobutu in a way that would enable him to accuse the West of dictating to him and thus encourage him to resist the reforms.

[REDACTED] The Moroccans have urged that Mobutu be given at least a few weeks to "regain his breath" before donors move in on him with new demands. The French have also balked at the joint approach because they prefer to approach such matters bilaterally.

25X1

[REDACTED] In an unusual move probably designed to head off the demarche, Mobutu has suspended all meetings between 10 and 16 June. He has also canceled his scheduled trip to Nigeria on Thursday.

25X1

[REDACTED] According to French press reports, Belgian recruiters for the Kolwezi mines have been offering Belgian technicians lucrative salaries to return to Kolwezi--so far without success.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010056-9

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010056-9

USSR: Chemical Warfare Inspection

25X1 [] *The Soviets are underlining their determined stand against obligatory international on-site inspection of chemical warfare facilities. Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak chemical warfare experts failed to attend last month's Pugwash Workshop dedicated to the concept of verification.*

25X1 [] The Soviets apparently feared the US would ask them to reciprocate for a visit to Tooele Army Depot by arranging a visit to a Soviet chemical warfare facility. In addition, the Soviets probably did not want to sign a Pugwash report endorsing the on-site concept as a viable approach to verification.

25X1 [] The absence of the East Germans may have been due to Moscow's desire to avoid any possible embarrassment resulting from a lack of coordination. Last summer, the East German delegate was upset about the Soviets' failure to coordinate their positions at Pugwash. We do not know why the Czechoslovak expert failed to attend the workshop this year.

25X1 [] The Soviet delegation at the Pugwash Workshop last August was unprepared for serious discussion of the on-site inspection issue. At bilateral chemical warfare disarmament talks in Geneva, the Soviets and the US have not yet agreed on a verification formula. The Soviets maintain that national means of verification, together with the possibility of challenge inspections, will suffice for on-site inspection. The US favors international on-site monitoring and inspection for the destruction of declared stocks and facilities. []

25X1

NORWAY-USSR-EC: Fishing Concerns

25X1 [] *//Norwegian Government efforts to impose fisheries regulations in two different areas in the Barents Sea are running into problems with the USSR, the EC, and Norwegian fishermen. The EC, in a note to Oslo, alleges discrimination because the Norwegians have permitted the Soviets to police their own fishermen around Svalbard and have not required them to share catch data with other nations fishing in the area. Norwegian*

fishermen are charging that Soviet trawlers to the east--in the so-called "gray zone" where Norwegian and Soviet territorial claims overlap--are not complying with the terms of a Soviet-Norwegian agreement concluded last year. Representatives from the two countries will discuss these issues at their semiannual Barents Sea fisheries talks this week.//

25X1

[] //Norway last year unilaterally declared a fisheries protective zone around Svalbard and subsequently sought approval from the other signatories of the Svalbard treaty, including the USSR. In order to win Soviet acceptance, Oslo apparently agreed to permit the Soviets to regulate their own trawlers and did not insist that catch data be reported on a ship-by-ship basis. The Soviets apparently convinced the Norwegians that they should be allowed to police themselves because they do 60 percent of the fishing in the area.//

25X1

[] //The EC alleges that the difference in procedures will allow the Soviets to violate the fishing limitations and insists that, at a minimum, Soviet data showing total catches be sent to Brussels. Because of the EC protest, the Norwegians have said that, after further discussions with the Soviets, they will modify the rules to make them more equitable.//

25X1

[] //Fisheries Minister Bolle, as the head of the Norwegian delegation at the talks this week, is empowered to renew for one year the "gray zone" fishing accord, even though it has come under attack from various quarters, including Norway's NATO allies. The Norwegian Government concluded this pact under pressure from the domestic fishing industry to protect the country's fishing resources; the fishermen are now pressing for stricter enforcement of the agreement.//

25X1

[] //According to the US Embassy in Oslo, the Norwegian Government will not submit the one-year extension to parliament for approval. It will thereby avoid a repetition of the strong criticism from the opposition and the press that accompanied ratification of the original agreement. The government believes a "gray zone" accord is necessary until it reaches agreement on a maritime boundary with the USSR--a subject the Soviets have been reluctant to negotiate. [] 25X1

BRIEF

Malaysia

25X1

[REDACTED] Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein bin Onn has set 8 July as the date for both national and state elections. Parliament and 10 state assemblies were dissolved yesterday.

25X1

[REDACTED] Malaysia's sound economic position, as well as Hussein's desire to gain a strong popular mandate before his party's General Assembly meets after the election, probably prompted the Prime Minister to call an election now--more than a year before the legal deadline. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010056-9

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010056-9
(Security Classification)